India and Pakistan, nuclear neighbors and rivals, fought the last of three major wars in 1971. Far from peaceful, however, the period since then has been "one long crisis, punctuated by periods of peace." The long-disputed Kashmir issue continues to be both a cause and consequence of India-Pakistan hostility. Four Crises and a Peace Process focuses on four contained conflicts on the subcontinent: the Brasstacks Crisis of 1986–1987, the Compound Crisis of 1990, the Kargil Conflict of 1999, and the Border Confrontation of 2001–2002. Authors P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Brookings senior fellow Stephen P. Cohen explain the underlying causes of these crises, their consequences, the lessons that can be learned, and the American role in each. The four crises are notable because any one of them could have escalated to a large-scale conflict, or even all-out war, and three took place after India and Pakistan had gone nuclear. Looking for larger trends of peace and conflict in the region, the authors consider these incidents as cases of attempted conflict resolution, as instances of limited war by nuclear-armed nations, and as examples of intervention and engagement by the United States and China. They analyze the reactions of Indian, Pakistani, and international media and assess the two countries' decision-making processes. Fo ur Crises and a Peace Process explains how these crises have affected regional and international policy and evaluates the prospects for lasting peace in South Asia.
India has long been motivated to modernize its military, and it now has the resources. But so far, the drive to rebuild has lacked a critical component—strategic military planning. India's approach of arming without strategic purpose remains viable, however, as it seeks great-power accommodation of its rise and does not want to appear threatening. What should we anticipate from this effort in the future, and what are the likely ramifications? Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta answer those crucial questions in a book so timely that it reached number two on the nonfiction bestseller list in India. "Two years after the publication of Arming without Aiming, our view is that India's strategic restraint and its consequent institutional arrangement remain in place. We do not want to predict that India's military-strategic restraint will last forever, but we do expect that the deeper problems in Indian defense policy will continue to slow down military modernization."—from the preface to the paperback edition
An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics, in contrast to other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how India and Pakistan utilise them for politico-strategic purposes in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape. Written by a group of perceptive observers of South Asia, this volume evaluates the current state of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrents, the challenges that the two countries confront in building their nuclear forces, the post-test nuclear doctrines of the two strategic rivals, the implications of Indo-Pakistani politics for regional cooperation, the role of two systemic actors (USA and China) in the region's nuclear politics and the critical issues of confidence-building and nuclear arms control.
The Long Shadow of the Cold War on the 21st Century
Author: Chandra Chari
Category: Political Science
Variously described by historians and thinkers as the ‘most terrible century in Western history’, ‘a century of massacres and wars’ and the ‘most violent century in human history’, the 20th century – and in particular the period between the First World War and the collapse of the USSR – forms a coherent historical period which changed the entire face of human history within a few decades. This book examines the trajectory of the Cold War and the fallouts for the rest of the world to seek lessons for the 21st century to manage international relations today and avoid conflict. Written by experts in their field, the chapters provide an alternative perspective to the Western-paradigm dominated international relations theory. The book examines for example whether now in the 21st century the unipolar moment has passed and if the changing economic balance of power, thrown up by globalization, has led to the emergence of a multipolar world capable of economic and multilateral cooperation. It discusses the potential of new cooperative security frameworks, which would provide an impetus to disarmament and protection of the environment globally and asks if nuclear disarmament is feasible and necessary. The book highlights areas in which the potential for conflict is ingrained. Offering Asian perspectives on these issues – perspectives from countries like Afganistan, Vietnam, West Asia and Pakistan which were embroiled in the Cold War as mere pawns and which have become flashpoints for conflict in our century – this book is an important contribution to the ongoing debate.
Rudra Chaudhuri's book examines a series of crises that led to far-reaching changes in India's approach to the United States, defining the contours of what is arguably the imperative relationship between America and the global South. Forged in Crisis provides a fresh interpretation of India's advance in foreign affairs under the stewardship of Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and finally, Manmohan Singh. It reveals the complex and distinctive manner in which India sought to pursue at once material interests and ideas, while meticulously challenging the shakier and largely untested reading of 'non-alignment' palpable in most works on Indian foreign policy and international relations. From the Korean War in 1950 to the considered debate within India on sending troops to Iraq in 2003, and from the loss of territory to China and the subsequent talks on Kashmir with Pakistan in 1962-63 to the signing of a civil nuclear agreement with Washington in 2008, Chaudhuri maps Indian negotiating styles and behaviour and how these shaped and informed decisions vital to its strategic interest, in turn redefining its relationship with the United States.
In February 1989, the CIA's chief in Islamabad famously cabled headquarters a simple message: "We Won." It was an understated coda to the most successful covert intelligence operation in American history. In What We Won, CIA and National Security Council veteran Bruce Riedel tells the story of America's secret war in Afghanistan and the defeat of the Soviet 40th Red Army in the war that proved to be the final battle of the cold war. He seeks to answer one simple question—why did this intelligence operation succeed so brilliantly? Riedel has the vantage point few others can offer: He was ensconced in the CIA's Operations Center when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979. The invasion took the intelligence community by surprise. But the response, initiated by Jimmy Carter and accelerated by Ronald Reagan, was a masterful intelligence enterprise. Many books have been written about intelligence failures—from Pearl Harbor to 9/11. Much less has been written about how and why intelligence operations succeed. The answer is complex. It involves both the weaknesses and mistakes of America's enemies, as well as good judgment and strengths of the United States. Riedel introduces and explores the complex personalities pitted in the war—the Afghan communists, the Russians, the Afghan mujahedin, the Saudis, and the Pakistanis. And then there are the Americans—in this war, no Americans fought on the battlefield. The CIA did not send officers into Afghanistan to fight or even to train. In 1989, victory for the American side of the cold war seemed complete. Now we can see that a new era was also beginning in the Afghan war in the 1980s, the era of the global jihad. This book examines the lessons we can learn from this intelligence operation for the future and makes some observations on what came next in Afghanistan—and what is likely yet to come.
This book interrogates the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement from its inception in July 2005 to its conclusion in the latter part of 2008 through 12 articles, each of which focuses on different aspects of the deal. They discuss the factors that facilitated the deal, the roadblocks that were encountered, and the implications of the deal for the future of India’s foreign policy, its energy security and the international non-proliferation regime. Together, they address the internal political dynamics in India and the United States in order to present perspectives of both countries.
This edited volume examines how the transition and diffusion of power in global politics is impacting on stability and order in Asia. Both in the academic field of International Relations (IR) and among policymakers, the big question today concerns the rise of China, the relative decline of the United States, and the increasing importance of Asia in global politics. The level of impact the international power transition will have in the region remains unclear, but observers agree that Asia is a potential tinderbox for crises and conflict. This volume brings together leading scholars from around the world to assess current thinking in IR on these issues. The authors apply appropriate theories and methods of analysis in their specific area of expertise to examine the likely effects of the changing global power distribution on Asia. There is also said to be an ongoing diffusion of power away from states to non-state actors in the region; hence, in addition to examining changing relations between the Great Powers, the book will also assess the implications that other actors, from terrorist groups, insurgents and organised crime syndicates, could have on stability and order. This book will be of much interest to students of Asian politics, security studies, diplomacy and international relations.