Search Results: victory-in-war-foundations-of-modern-strategy

Victory in War

Foundations of Modern Strategy

Author: William C. Martel

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN: 113949970X

Category: Political Science

Page: N.A

View: 9185

War demands that scholars and policy makers use victory in precise and coherent terms to communicate what the state seeks to achieve in war. The failure historically to define victory in consistent terms has contributed to confused debates when societies consider whether to wage war. This volume explores the development of a theoretical narrative or language of victory to help scholars and policy makers define carefully and precisely what they mean by victory in war in order to achieve a deeper understanding of victory as the foundation of strategy in the modern world.

Victory in War

Foundations of Modern Military Policy

Author: William C. Martel

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN: 1139460412

Category: Law

Page: N.A

View: 1233

For millennia, policymakers and statesmen have grappled with questions about the concept of victory in war. How long does it take to achieve victory and how do we know when victory is achieved? And, as highlighted by the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, is it possible to win a war and yet lose the peace? The premise of this book is that we do not have a modern theory about victory and that, in order to answer these questions, we need one. This book explores historical definitions of victory, how victory has evolved, and how it has been implemented in war. It also subsequently develops the intellectual foundations of a modern pre-theory of victory, and discusses the military instruments necessary for victory in the twenty-first century using case studies that include US military intervention in Panama, Libya, Persian Gulf War, Bosnia/Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice

The Need for an Effective American Foreign Policy

Author: William C. Martel

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN: 1316148165

Category: Political Science

Page: N.A

View: 2850

This book explores fundamental questions about grand strategy, as it has evolved across generations and countries. It provides an overview of the ancient era of grand strategy and a detailed discussion of its philosophical, military, and economic foundations in the modern era. The author investigates these aspects through the lenses of four approaches - those of historians, social scientists, practitioners, and military strategists. The main goal is to provide contemporary policy makers and scholars with a historic and analytic framework in which to evaluate and conduct grand strategy. By providing greater analytical clarity about grand strategy and describing its nature and its utility for the state, this book presents a comprehensive theory on the practice of grand strategy in order to articulate the United States' past, present, and future purpose and position on the world stage.

Military Power

Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

Author: Stephen Biddle

Publisher: Princeton University Press

ISBN: 9781400837823

Category: Political Science

Page: 352

View: 9150

In war, do mass and materiel matter most? Will states with the largest, best equipped, information-technology-rich militaries invariably win? The prevailing answer today among both scholars and policymakers is yes. But this is to overlook force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which materiel is actually used. In a landmark reconception of battle and war, this book provides a systematic account of how force employment interacts with materiel to produce real combat outcomes. Stephen Biddle argues that force employment is central to modern war, becoming increasingly important since 1900 as the key to surviving ever more lethal weaponry. Technological change produces opposite effects depending on how forces are employed; to focus only on materiel is thus to risk major error--with serious consequences for both policy and scholarship. In clear, fluent prose, Biddle provides a systematic account of force employment's role and shows how this account holds up under rigorous, multimethod testing. The results challenge a wide variety of standard views, from current expectations for a revolution in military affairs to mainstream scholarship in international relations and orthodox interpretations of modern military history. Military Power will have a resounding impact on both scholarship in the field and on policy debates over the future of warfare, the size of the military, and the makeup of the defense budget.

Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II

The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson

Author: Richard W. Harrison

Publisher: McFarland

ISBN: 0786456671

Category: History

Page: 411

View: 3380

The Red Army’s leading operational theorist in the 1930s, Georgii Samoilovich Isserson was the mastermind behind the “deep operation”—the cornerstone of Soviet offensive operations in World War II. Drawing from an in-depth analysis of Isserson’s numerous published and unpublished works, his arrest file in the former KGB archives, and interviews with his family, this book provides the first full-length biography of the man. The bulk of the narrative deals with the flowering of his intellectual talents from 1929 through 1941. Additional chapters deal with Isserson’s arrest and his remaining 35 years, 14 of which were spent in labor camps and internal exile.

Adapting to Win

How Insurgents Fight and Defeat Foreign States in War

Author: Noriyuki Katagiri

Publisher: University of Pennsylvania Press

ISBN: 0812246411

Category: Political Science

Page: 312

View: 9954

When insurgent groups challenge powerful states, defeat is not always inevitable. Increasingly, guerrilla forces have overcome enormous disadvantages and succeeded in extending the period of violent conflict, raising the costs of war, and occasionally winning. Noriyuki Katagiri investigates the circumstances and tactics that allow some insurgencies to succeed in wars against foreign governments while others fail. Adapting to Win examines almost 150 instances of violent insurgencies pitted against state powers, including in-depth case studies of the war in Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq war. By applying sequencing theory, Katagiri provides insights into guerrilla operations ranging from Somalia to Benin and Indochina, demonstrating how some insurgents learn and change in response to shifting circumstances. Ultimately, his research shows that successful insurgent groups have evolved into mature armed forces, and then demonstrates what evolutionary paths are likely to be successful or unsuccessful for those organizations. Adapting to Win will interest scholars of international relations, security studies, and third world politics and contains implications for government officials, military officers, and strategic thinkers around the globe as they grapple with how to cope with tenacious and violent insurgent organizations.

Inside Defense

Understanding the U.S. Military in the 21st Century

Author: D. Reveron,Judith Hicks Stiehm

Publisher: Springer

ISBN: 0230613780

Category: Political Science

Page: 279

View: 3229

Inside Defense brings together scholars, policy experts and practitioners to provide a comprehensive view of the U.S. military to understand the military's role in international politics and its relationship with domestic institutions and society.

No Substitute for Victory

Author: Theodore B. Kinni,Donna Kinni,Caspar Weinberger

Publisher: Ft Press

ISBN: 9780137150823

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 288

View: 5332

General MacArthur defined principles of leadership that were decades ahead of their time. In this book, the authors reveal what MacArthur knew about setting the right goals, building sleek, fast-response organizations, inspiring subordinates to unprecedented performance, focusing relentlessly on results, and winning.

Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare

Author: Mark McNeilly

Publisher: Oxford University Press on Demand

ISBN: 9780195161083

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 328

View: 9393

Long acknowledged as a classic text on strategy, Sun Tzu's The Art of War had been admired by leaders as diverse as Mao Zedong and General Norman Schwartzkopf. However, written two thousand years ago, the book can often be hard to fathom. Author Mark McNeilly has extracted six concepts most applicable to modern warfare and made them easy to understand and apply to military situations. Drawing on a wealth of fascinating historical examples, McNeilly shows how these six principles might be used in wars of the future and how they can provide insight into current affairs. Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from Sun Tzu, especially for strategists who want to maximize their resources, is how to "win without fighting".

The Rules of Victory

How to Transform Chaos and Conflict : Strategies from The Art of War

Author: James Gimian,Barry Boyce

Publisher: Shambhala Publications

ISBN: 1590307011

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 293

View: 9777

An accessible introduction to Sun Tzu's The Art of War explains how to adapt the principles and practices espoused by the ancient treatise on leadership and strategy to the events, opportunities, and situations of everyday modern life, in a volume that includes a complete translation of the classical text, as well as engaging case studies and examples drawn from a variety of contexts. 30,000 first printing.

21st Century Ellis

Operational Art and Strategic Prophecy for the Modern Era

Author: Brent Friedman

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

ISBN: 1612518087

Category: History

Page: 176

View: 6701

For years, the Marine Corps has touted the prescience of Lieutenant Colonel “Pete” Ellis, USMC, who predicted in 1921 that the United States would fight Japan and how the Pacific Theater would be won. Now, for the first time, those predictions and other works by the “amphibious prophet” are available in print. Included is two works by Ellis on naval and amphibious operations, including Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, the study of tactics and operations in the Pacific Ocean that the United States Navy and Marine Corps would use to win the war against Imperial Japan. Ellis describes the form and functions of a modern Marine Corps designed to win its Nation’s battles. Ellis’ ideas about how the Marine Corps should fight are still in use throughout the world today. Ellis’ ideas on amphibious operations are well known, but his ideas on counterinsurgency and conventional war have been overshadowed and forgotten. Ellis wrote two articles based on his warfighting experiences in the Philippines and as part of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe during World War I. These articles, last published in the early 1920’s, are both republished in this book and show Ellis as a prescient thinker who was ahead of his time. Ellis identifies concepts that the U.S. military struggles with even today, and that other thinkers would not identify for decades after Ellis’ death. Also included are six essays by the editor, introducing the ideas of Pete Ellis and putting them in a modern context. As the United States turns its focus to the Pacific, Ellis’ ideas can inform policymakers on the dynamics of strategy and warfare in the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean. Edited by Captain B. A. Friedman, USMC, 21st Century Ellis reveals the strategic insights of Pete Ellis for then and now.

Science, Strategy and War

The Strategic Theory of John Boyd

Author: Frans P.B. Osinga

Publisher: Routledge

ISBN: 1134197098

Category: History

Page: 336

View: 1271

John Boyd is often known exclusively for the so-called ‘OODA’ loop model he developed. This model refers to a decision-making process and to the idea that military victory goes to the side that can complete the cycle from observation to action the fastest. This book aims to redress this state of affairs and re-examines John Boyd’s original contribution to strategic theory. By highlighting diverse sources that shaped Boyd’s thinking, and by offering a comprehensive overview of Boyd’s work, this volume demonstrates that the common interpretation of the meaning of Boyd’s OODA loop concept is incomplete. It also shows that Boyd’s work is much more comprehensive, richer and deeper than is generally thought. With his ideas featuring in the literature on Network Centric Warfare, a key element of the US and NATO’s so-called ‘military transformation’ programmes, as well as in the debate on Fourth Generation Warfare, Boyd continues to exert a strong influence on Western military thinking. Dr Osinga demonstrates how Boyd’s work can helps us to understand the new strategic threats in the post- 9/11 world, and establishes why John Boyd should be regarded as one of the most important (post)modern strategic theorists.

Winning the Battle for Sales: Lessons on Closing Every Deal from the World’s Greatest Military Victories

Author: John Golden

Publisher: McGraw Hill Professional

ISBN: 0071792007

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 240

View: 7891

FROM THE CREATORS OF SPIN SELLING—TRIED-AND-TRUE STRATEGIES TO ARM YOU IN THE WAR FOR SALES SUPREMACY "I distinctly remember my first VP talking about 'campaigns' and 'targets.' Indeed, successful salespeople have made learning from military tactics an important aspect of their careers. In this engaging read chock-full of practical and richly illustrated examples, John Golden provides strategies that are sure to increase even the most seasoned sales pros' success rates. It's a completely new take on sales education with powerful lessons you'll use to win your own sales battles." -- David Meerman Scott, bestselling author of The New Rules of Marketing and PR "There’s no doubt salespeople will profit from the book’s focus on besting one's opponent in a battleground much changed by the information explosion of the Internet." -- William Dermody, World/Military Affairs Editor, USA Today "An innovative and very insightful perspective on what it really takes to win." -- Dave Stein, CEO and founder, ES Research Group, Inc. "Great sales lessons presented in a really unique and interesting format . . . I recommend it for sales people starting out in the field as well as seasoned pros. -- Chuck Lennon, President, TeamLogic "A good military strategist is, after all, a salesman, which leads me to believe that a good salesman would make a good military strategist. The author has done an excellent job of showing how those two different communities are in fact very similar." -- Brigadier General Julie A. Bentz, PhDTM

Victory at Midway

The Battle That Changed the Course of World War II

Author: James M. D’Angelo

Publisher: McFarland

ISBN: 1476629951

Category: History

Page: 206

View: 3528

 In the five months after Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy won a string of victories in a campaign to consolidate control of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. In June of 1942, Japan suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle of Midway and was never again able to take the offensive in the Pacific. Bringing fresh perspective to the battle and its consequences, the author identifies Japan’s operational plan as a major factor in its Navy’s demise and describes the profound effects Midway had on the course of the war in Europe.

US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy

The Evolution of an Incidental Superpower

Author: Derek S. Reveron,Nikolas K. Gvosdev,Mackubin Thomas Owens

Publisher: Georgetown University Press

ISBN: 1626161593

Category: Political Science

Page: 272

View: 4006

Safe from the battlefields of Europe and Asia, the United States led the post–World War II global economic recovery through international assistance and foreign direct investment. With an ardent decolonization agenda and a postwar legitimacy, the United States attempted to construct a world characterized by cooperation. When American optimism clashed with Soviet expansionism, the United States started on a path to global hegemony. In US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy, the authors analyze the strategic underpinnings of hegemony, assess the national security establishment that sustains dominance, consider the impact on civil-military relations, and explore the intertwining relationships between foreign policy, defense strategy, and commercial activities. Eschewing conventional analyses, the volume not only identifies drivers and continuities in foreign policy, but it also examines how the legacy of the last sixty-five years will influence future national security policy that will be characterized by US leadership in an increasingly competitive world. From civil-military relations to finance, and from competing visions of how America should make war to its philosophy of securing peace through reconstruction and reconciliation, US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy offers unique insights into the links between military and commercial power as it charts the rise of a historical rarity: the incidental superpower. This accessibly written book is suitable for students and general readers as well as scholars.

Carrying the War to the Enemy

American Operational Art to 1945

Author: Michael R. Matheny

Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press

ISBN: 080618597X

Category: History

Page: 320

View: 5658

Military commanders turn tactics into strategic victory by means of "operational art," the knowledge and creative imagination commanders and staff employ in designing, synchronizing, and conducting battles and major operations to achieve strategic goals. Until now, historians of military theory have generally agreed that modern operational art developed between the first and second world wars, not in the United States but in Germany and the Soviet Union, whose armies were supposedly the innovators and greatest practitioners of operational art. Some have even claimed that U.S. forces struggled in World War II because their commanders had no systematic understanding of operational art. Michael R. Matheny believes previous studies have not appreciated the evolution of U.S. military thinking at the operational level. Although they may rightly point to the U.S. Army's failure to modernize or develop a sophisticated combined arms doctrine during the interwar years, they focus too much on technology or tactical doctrine. In his revealing account, Matheny shows that it was at the operational level, particularly in mounting joint and combined operations, that senior American commanders excelled—and laid a foundation for their country's victory in World War II. Matheny draws on archival materials from military educational institutions, planning documents, and operational records of World War II campaigns. Examining in detail the development of American operational art as land, sea, and air power matured in the twentieth century, he shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. war colleges educated and trained commanders during the interwar years specifically for the operational art they employed in World War II. After 1945, in the face of nuclear warfare, the American military largely abandoned operational art. But since the Vietnam War, U.S. commanders have found operational art increasingly important as they pursue modern global and expeditionary warfare requiring coordination among multiple service branches and the forces of allied countries.

War and the Art of Governance

Consolidating Combat Success Into Political Victory

Author: Nadia Schadlow

Publisher: Georgetown University Press

ISBN: 162616410X

Category: Political Science

Page: 344

View: 649

Success in war ultimately depends on the consolidation of political order. Nadia Schadlow argues that the steps needed to consolidate a new political order are not separate from war. They are instead an essential component of war and victory. The challenge of governance operations did not start with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army’s involvement in the political and economic reconstruction of states has been central to all its armed conflicts from large-scale conventional wars to so-called irregular or counterinsurgency wars. Yet, US policymakers and military leaders have failed to institutionalize lessons on how to consolidate combat gains into desired political outcomes. War and the Art of Governance examines fifteen historical cases of US Army military interventions, from the Mexican War through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Improving future outcomes will require US policymakers and military leaders to accept that plans, timelines, and resources must be shaped to reflect this reality before they intervene in a conflict, not after things go wrong. Schadlow provides clear lessons for students and scholars of security studies and military history, as well as for policymakers and the military personnel who will be involved in the next foreign intervention.

Margin of Victory

Five Battles That Changed the Face of Modern War

Author: Douglas Macgregor

Publisher: Naval Institute Press

ISBN: 1612519970

Category: History

Page: 288

View: 6645

Hindsight can become foresight if viewed through the right lens. Margin of Victory views the outcomes of five horrific twentieth century battles through the lens of military strategy; force design and modernization, all of which decisively influence the savage fighting on the day of battle. From the house to house fighting in Shanghai, China to the dense forests of Western Russia and the deserts of the Middle East, the recurring theme is powerful: Victorious nation-states accept the pressing need for change and implement the tough reforms in military organization, technology and human capital that are essential to future victory, sometimes decades before a major war begins. Meanwhile, national militaries that are allowed to live in the past, that fail to shed outworn assumptions about warfighting play catch-up when war comes; a situation that leads to an enormous loss of human life and, ultimately, to total defeat. Margin of Victory’s riveting stories of victory and defeat are presented against the backdrop of national policies, culture and history. Each chapter is a reminder that to be successful military action must always be congruent with national culture, geography and scientific-industrial capacity; that strategy and geopolitics inevitably trump ideology. Building effective military power takes time, resources and imagination. Unity of command; unity of effort and the integration of capabilities across service lines only happen when they are ruthlessly imposed from the top down. These are some of the enduring lessons in the five warfighting dramas that unfold in vivid detail on the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. Margin of Victory concludes with a discussion of future battle and how the United States can leverage the twentieth century’s lessons to secure its margin of victory in the twenty first century. The final chapter argues that America’s future victories depend on a major reset of U.S. national military strategy and an overhaul of U.S. military command structures and force design. The author’s reset includes the creation of a national defense staff, Joint Force Commands inside the regional unified commands and a plea to cultivate America’s greatest margin of victory, its human capital; the high quality of American Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines.

The Utility of Force

Author: Rupert Smith

Publisher: Vintage

ISBN: 0307267415

Category: History

Page: 448

View: 4318

From a highly decorated general, a brilliant new way of understanding war and its role in the twenty-first century. Drawing on his vast experience as a commander during the first Gulf War, and in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, General Rupert Smith gives us a probing analysis of modern war. He demonstrates why today’s conflicts must be understood as intertwined political and military events, and makes clear why the current model of total war has failed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other recent campaigns. Smith offers a compelling contemporary vision for how to secure our world and the consequences of ignoring the new, shifting face of war. From the Trade Paperback edition.

Lost Victory

A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam

Author: William Egan Colby,James McCargar

Publisher: McGraw-Hill/Contemporary

ISBN: N.A

Category: Biography & Autobiography

Page: 438

View: 3067

The former CIA director contends that decisions made over five administrations cost America its military victory in Vietnam

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